Macroeconomic Conditions at Entry and Injury Risk at the Workplace by Leombruni, Roberto et al.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
Macroeconomic Conditions at Entry and
Injury Risk at the Workplace∗
Roberto Leombruni
University of Turin, IT-10136, Torino, Italy
roberto.leombruni@unito.it
Tiziano Razzolini
University of Siena, IT-53100, Siena, Italy
tiziano.razzolini@unisi.it
Francesco Serti
IMT School of Advances Studies, IT-55100, Lucca, Italy
francesco.serti@gmail.com
Abstract
Using a unique dataset from Italy, we show that the local unemployment rate at entry
has a persistent positive effect on severe and non-severe workplace injuries of young
workers. Entrants during recessions, although receiving marginally higher entry wages,
also experience slower wage growth. The observed pattern in the differences between
severe and non-severe injuries indicates that entrants during recession may underreport
non-severe workplace injuries. Our findings suggest that workers entering during
recession are persistently locked into low quality jobs and that the mix of hazardous
tasks endogenously adjusts to the business cycle.
Keywords: work-related accidents; business cycle; young workers
JEL classification codes: J28; J60; J81
I Introduction
The macroeconomic conditions encountered by workers entering the labor market for
the first time may persistently affect their future labor market outcomes. The existing
evidence (Oyer, 2006; Genda et al., 2010; Kahn, 2010; Kwon et al., 2010; Oreopoulos
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le et al., 2012; Brunner and Kuhn, 2014) mainly focuses on the wages prospects of youngentrants. Little attention has been devoted to other non-pecuniary determinants of jobquality, such as the level of workplace safety. These job attributes may represent an
important channel of adjustment to negative shocks, particularly in contexts where wages
are rigid and regulated by strict institutional rules.
This paper studies the impact of unemployment at entry on workplace safety for a
sample of young Italian-born, low- and medium-skilled men who began their first em-
ployment between 1994 and 2003. We use a unique dataset that combines work histories
from Italian administrative data (Work Histories Italian Panel, WHIP) with individual
work-related injuries from the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority (INAIL).
Our main finding is that negative labor market conditions at entry are associated with
a persistent increase in work-related accidents. This effect cannot be simply attributed
to a lower accumulation of experience and/or tenure, as we find no significant effect of
initial conditions on time worked (conditional or unconditional on being employed) and
find very small negative effects on tenure only in the long run. Our results are robust to
restricting the analyses to severe injuries, which, due to their consequences and immediate
care needs, are not subject to reporting bias (Boone and van Ours, 2006; Boone et al.,
2011), and to using as a dependent variable a measure of the risk imposed by the working
environment, which is not affected by either workers’ behavior in the job or variations of
firms’ injury prevention investments over the business cycle.
An analysis based only on earnings could be particularly misleading in labor markets,
such as the Italian one, that are characterized by downward wage rigidity and a large
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le shadow economy (approximately 23% of Italian official GDP, according to Orsi et al.,2014). In these economies, recessions may push relatively less productive workers intothe underground economy, leaving only better-paid workers in the formal sector. Indeed,
by using the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), we find that the likelihood
of a young worker beginning her career in an informal (low-paid) job increases significantly
during recessions. We show that this a selection mechanism could explain why, in the
administrative dataset, we observe that workers who entered during recessions receive
slightly higher average entry wages. To the extent that working conditions and wages are
relatively worse in the underground economy, our results should provide a lower bound
estimate of the impact of starting conditions on the time spent by new workers in low-
quality jobs offering relatively fewer career prospects.
Using a canonical graphical analysis, we show that our findings are consistent with a
scenario in which entrants during recessions become relatively more willing to bear risk,
and firms react by offering wage-job safety bundles characterized by a lower compensa-
tion for risk. In the presence of downward wage rigidity, these endogenous responses to
recessions are able to explain both the higher average wages and injury risk observed in
the formal sector and the detected countercyclical pattern of the underground economy.
Finally, our evidence on lower levels of job safety represents an unexplored channel
through which unfavorable initial conditions may negatively affect workers’ health status
(Maclean, 2013). Moreover, our findings contribute to the literature on the relation
between reporting behavior and the business cycle. Analyzing injury dynamics by their
severity reveals that worker reporting behavior, in addition to being affected by the
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le contemporaneous economic cycle, also depends on the starting conditions.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews theeconomic literature on the effect of adverse conditions at entry. Section III describes the
data. The econometric framework and the empirical results are presented and discussed
in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II Related literature and theoretical background
The previous literature has mainly investigated the effect of high unemployment at entry
on pecuniary labor market outcomes for countries characterized by greater wage flexibility
than the Italian labor market. The bulk of these studies focus on entrants with at
least a college education in North America (Oyer, 2006; Genda et al., 2010; Kahn, 2010;
Oreopoulos et al., 2012) and detect a wage penalty for those who entered during recession
that vanishes in approximately ten years. However, for a sample of Austrian low- and
medium-skilled workers, Brunner and Kuhn (2014) find an increasing negative effect of
the initial unemployment on wages. Genda et al. (2010) detect a negative and persistent
impact of unemployment at entry on earnings for low- and medium-skilled Japanese
workers but not for their US counterparts; they also argue that institutional differences
(i.e., stronger employment protection legislation in Japan coupled with a school-based
hiring system) may contribute to this result. Finally, Maclean (2013) shows that, for US
middle-aged men, leaving school in a recession decreases mental and physical health.
With labor market rigidities, adverse conditions at entry are more likely to affect
outcomes such as employment (Raaum and Røed, 2006) or other non-pecuniary charac-
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le teristics rather than wages. The Italian labor market is an interesting case to study theeffect of unfavorable initial conditions since, among European countries, Italy ranks thehighest in terms of employment protection legislation, wage compression and downward
wage rigidity as well as in terms of centralized wage bargaining and trade union coverage
(OECD, 1999,2004). Thus, adjustments to economic downturns may reasonably produce
negligible effects on wages and occur through alternative channels such as job safety.
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Figure 1: Optimal combinations of wages and injury risk along the business cycle
Note: The figure shows the optimal combination of wages and injury risk in a given job for heterogeneous
workers as the tangency points between isoprofit curves ΠP (w, inj) and utility curves UP (w, inj), with
P = H,M,L. Panels (a) and (b) represent the equilibria in the good and bad state of the economy,
respectively.
To develop this intuition, in Figure 1, we describe the optimal combinations of wages
and injuries that may emerge in equilibrium during different states of the economy for
three types of workers who differ in their level of earning potentials: high, ξH , medium,
ξM and low, ξL. Given the presence of wage rigidities and centralized wage bargaining
in the Italian labor market, we assume that each job has a minimum contractual wage
(i.e., the dashed horizontal lines in the two panels of Figure 1). However, employers do
have some discretion in offering different market opportunities to workers according to
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le their earning potentials. This heterogeneity in market opportunities reflects unobserveddifferences that cannot be fully captured in our empirical analysis even after controlling forobserved job, employer and firm characteristics (e.g., workers’ productivity). We denote
the isoprofit curves as ΠP (w, inj) and the utility curves as UP (w, inj), with P = H,M,L.
In panel (a) we show that, even in the presence of a positive compensation for risk
(∂Π/∂inj > 0), more productive workers (types H and M) are paid more by the firm than
type L workers and can cede a portion of their salary in exchange for more workplace
safety.1 Thus, we have types H and M workers exhibiting higher wages and lower injury
risk than type L workers. We assume that this situation is typical in a strong state
of the economy when certain combinations (points H and M) are above the minimum
contractual wage, and others are represented by a corner solution (point LL).
In panel (b), we assume that recessions may have two effects. First, the recessions
reduce the earning potentials of all workers (ξ′H , ξ
′
M and ξ
′
L), thus leading to a downward
shift in the isoprofit curves. Second, the recessions induce a change in the slope of
the isoprofit curves. The latter effect is essentially similar to the scenario proposed by
Viscusi and Hersch (2001) in which segmented labor groups face market opportunities
with different wage-risk trade-offs.2 In other words, distressed firms may offer flatter
combinations of wages and risk (i.e., the isoprofit curves, Π′P (w, inj) in panel b) because
they realize that, during downturns, entrants may accept a reduction in workplace safety
1This explains why empirical analyses display a negative correlation between wages and injuries even
after controlling for observable worker, job and firm characteristics (see among others Hamermesh, 1999).
2Viscusi and Hersch (2001) study differences in workplace risk between smokers and non-smokers.
They assume that market opportunities offered by employers to smokers are flatter than those offered
to non-smokers (i.e., with lower premia for risk). In our scenario, segmentation is not related to an
individual attribute but to labor market conditions. We are grateful to Joni Hersch for having indirectly
suggested the possibility of this difference in the wage-risk trade-off.
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′
P (w, inj) in panel
b). Thus, new combinations can occur for high and medium productive workers at
H ′ and M ′, if only isoprofit curves flatten, and at H∗ and M∗ if the slope of utility
curves also decreases. These changes in market opportunities are in accordance with the
assumptions made by Gibbons and Waldman (2006) that, during slowdowns, employers
create a higher proportion of low level positions.3 Isoprofit and utility curves may also
flatten in a recession because of the strong insider-outsider dualism characterizing the
Italian labor market (i.e., wage rigidity, centralized wage bargaining, high employment
protection and union coverage). In this setting, trade unions are expected to exert strict
control over the job contract characteristics of entrants, such that insiders could remain
protected against macroeconomics shocks, and their jobs could not be threatened by
wage underbidding.4 Entrants may be requested to bear the consequences of unfavorable
macroeconomic conditions by paying a higher price in terms of workplace risk, which they
may consider a fair investment to become future insiders. Nevertheless, in an insider-
outsider context, the hazardous tasks assigned to young workers should continue to receive
positive compensation for risk to not represent a threat to insiders.
The example of panel (b) in Figure 1 shows that, if during a recession isoprofit curves
sufficiently flatten, the optimal combinations of wages and injuries for low productivity
workers will lie below the minimum contractual wage (points L′ or L∗); no amount of
3In the task-specific human capital model of Gibbons and Waldman (2006), wage represents the
unique index of the quality of the job. In our setting, a reduction in the quality of jobs offered during a
recession can be driven by an increase in the number of hazardous tasks at a given level of wage or by a
decrease in the premium/remuneration of risk at any level of wage.
4In a typical insider-outsider dualism (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001), entrants are very unlikely to be
hired on terms that oppose insiders’ interest.
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le injury risk would compensate for their low level of productivity at the minimum wage.These workers can be profitably hired only in the shadow economy, which is characterizedby wages below the minimum wage and by relatively unfavorable job safety conditions.5
Thus, Figure 1 illustrates that workers entering the formal sector during recessions are
positively selected. To the extent that both the isoprofit and the utility curves sufficiently
flatten, these workers will display, as expected, higher average wages, but they will be as-
signed to lower-quality jobs characterized by higher average injury rates. However, Figure
1 constitutes a static picture. These unfavorable entry outcomes may have long-lasting
consequences on the career prospects of entrants. According to Gibbons and Waldman
(2006), new entrants facing poor macroeconomic conditions are assigned to lower qual-
ity tasks that offer relatively fewer opportunities for accumulating the skills necessary
for career progress. The lower transferability of these accumulated skills to higher-level
occupations negatively affects actual workers’ productivity. Moreover, including the em-
ployers’ imperfect information about worker productivity could rationalize a persistent
effect of the initial conditions. Prospective employers could perceive the initial low-rank
job as a signal of the workers’ ability, without considering the macroeconomic conditions
at the time of labor market entry (Oyer, 2006). Oreopoulos et al. (2012) show that a
standard job-search model, augmented with mobility costs that increase with job tenure
or age, is also consistent with the persistent effects of unfavorable initial conditions. If the
benefits of searching are sufficiently low (or the mobility costs increase sufficiently steeply
with age), the catch-up of unlucky entrants may terminate before the gap is closed. Fi-
5This is consistent with the observed countercyclicality of the share of entrants in the underground
economy.
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cept long-term contracts characterized by lower wage growth and may encounter mobility
costs. All of these mechanisms of persistence may be reinforced by labor market rigidi-
ties, which may contribute to perpetuating the segmentation between lucky and unlucky
generations. Indeed, Kawaguchi and Murao (2014) show that, with strict EPL and high
union coverage, the persistence of the effects of recession is relatively stronger.
III Data Description
We use the WHIP-Salute database, which merges together data on work careers derived
from the administrative records of the National Social Security Administration (INPS),
with data on work injuries derived from the administrative records of the National Work
Injuries Insurance Administration (INAIL) (Bena et al., 2012). The target population
includes employees who worked in the private non-agricultural sector in Italy in the 1985-
2003 period, from which a 6% random sample has been extracted. Career data provide
job start and job end dates, in addition to the actual duration in weeks of each em-
ployment relationship. The data also provide information on worker characteristics (age,
sex, birthplace, place of work and type of occupation), standard labor market outcomes
(number of weeks worked in a year and annual earnings) and characteristics of the firms
in which individuals are employed (number of employees, sector and firm age). Weekly
wages are computed as the ratio between annual deflated earnings and the number of
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le weeks worked in a year, with both variables measured on a full-time equivalent scale.The INAIL dataset contains the date of workplace injuries (i.e., accidents that have oc-curred during a work task), the duration of injury-related leave at the employer-employee
level and a description of the type of injury. The dataset includes all injuries, certified by
physicians, leading to a leave of more than three days for the 1994-2003 period.6 Using
the information on the diagnosis, we adopt a classification that distinguishes immediate
care (IC) injuries from the non-immediate care (NIC) ones. The former identify work-
place accidents that require immediate treatment at a hospital and therefore cannot be
subject to reporting bias (Boone and van Ours, 2006).
We selected Italian-born men7 who had their first labor market experience between
1994 and 2003 and who were under 24 years old at the time of entry. We define ”first-time
labor market entrants” as those workers who are observed for the first time in the sample
in 1994 or later.8 As the WHIP-Salute dataset does not adequately cover the public
sector, we also exclude labor market entrants and employment spells in those industries.9
The resulting sample is representative of 70% of first time labor market entrants in Italy
during the 1994-2003 period. Although no information on schooling is available in the
data, the restriction on age in practice excludes individuals with higher education/skills
6Shorter healing periods do not involve INAIL but are the responsibility of the firm, according to
collective contract agreements.
7The restriction on gender is targeted to reduce the unobserved heterogeneity that reflects the com-
plexity of female labor supply behavior over the life cycle.
8We can observe the labor market history of individuals from 1985 to 2003. By considering entrants
who are under 24 years old at the time of entry, we exclude the pre-1971 birth cohorts.
9The following ATECO 1991/ISIC rev 1.1 codes are omitted from the analysis: L, M, N, O. This
barely affects the representativeness of the data. Indeed, only 4.9% of the selected labor market entrants
begin their career in the public sector, and only 4.7% of individuals in the final sample have job spells
in the public sector. Finally, because of its high degree of seasonality and undeclared work, we checked
that our results are robust to excluding employment spells in the construction sector.
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10 and therefore reduces the potential unobserved
heterogeneity problems related to this important dimension. Moreover, job safety should
be less relevant for labor market entrants with higher education who tend to perform
non-manual tasks. Therefore, due both to data limitations and for conceptual reasons,
we concentrate on low- and medium-skilled entrants.
In accordance with the literature, we use unemployment rates to proxy for the eco-
nomic cycle. In particular, we use data on regional unemployment rates for all workers
over the 1985-2003 period from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The
slowdown of the Italian economy after 1993 resulted in an increasing trend in unem-
ployment until 1998. A recovery occurred thereafter. Italian regions markedly differ in
the level of unemployment, with the South lagging the developed North. However, to
take into account the unobserved heterogeneity connected to the different entry cohorts
and the different regional labor markets, our identification strategy is conditional on the
region of entry and on the year of entry.
IV Effects of Macroeconomic Conditions at Entry
Estimation Strategy
We study the effect of initial unemployment rate in the region of entry, uri0, on various
labor market outcomes over time, yit, by adopting the following standard specification
(Oreopoulos et al., 2012):
10According to the AlmaLaurea surveys (www.almalaurea.it/en/), in 2003, only 0.7 % of students who
completed their undergraduate studies were 23 years old or younger, with 28 being the average age of
graduation. During the previous years included in our sample, the average age of graduation was higher.
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In addition to introducing unrestricted fixed effects for years of potential experience,
ψs, we interact unemployment at entry in region r with dummies specific for each year
of potential experience. Thus, the effect of the unemployment at entry is allowed to be
different at each year of potential experience: βs represents the marginal effect of the
initial unemployment rate s years after entry. To isolate the effect of the initial labor
market conditions from subsequent macroeconomic shocks possibly correlated with initial
conditions, we control for the current regional employment rate, urit. To the extent that
region-cohort specific variations in unemployment rates at entry are not correlated with
unobserved traits of entrants, the estimated βss will be exclusively driven by variations in
labor demand conditions, and will deliver an unbiased estimate of the effects of recession
on entrants’ outcomes (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Although we take into account several
sources of unobserved heterogeneity (connected to potential experience, ψs, the region
of birth, µb, the region of entry, λr, the year of entry cohort, γl, and the calendar year,
θt), entrants encountering different demand conditions may not be fully comparable in
terms of unobserved characteristics. Therefore, we also present the results obtained by
augmenting the above baseline specification with additional controls related to the entry
job (i.e., type of occupation such as apprentice,11 blue collar, white collar, manager, as
well as firm sector, size and age). Finally, we implement various robustness checks to
investigate how our findings are likely to be affected by endogenous labor market entry,
11Apprenticeship is a form of temporary employment contract for workers under age 26.
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12
Main Results
We first focus our analysis on standard labor outcomes such as log weekly wages, log
annual earnings and log annual weeks worked. We also use all observations in the 1994-
2003 period to construct an index to measure the log mean wage in occupations in the
same sector. By using this index as a dependent variable, we can detect the movement
of workers in occupations receiving higher or lower salaries on average. Figure 2 shows
the estimated effect of ur0 by year of experience on the log weekly wages, the log wage
index, the log annual earnings and the log of weeks worked.13
Panel (a) indicates that a one-point increase in the unemployment rate is associated
with an increase in starting wage levels by 1.6%.14 However, during periods of high un-
employment, entrants display a relatively lower wage growth. Indeed, the initial premium
decreases rapidly and fades away after 7 years of experience. The results in Panel (b)
focus on the log wage index and indicate that entrants during recessions are more likely
to start in occupations that receive higher compensations on average. The effect of ur0
on the log wage index is more persistent than the effect on the individual wages, thus
suggesting that these cohorts of workers may have lower mobility rates from these occu-
pations. Panels (c) and (d) confirm the presence of a marginal premium also in terms
12To fully exploit all the available information about the timing of the occurrence of injuries, we
have also repeated the analysis within a duration framework. As shown in section A.3.4 of the Online
Appendix, the results we obtained are very similar to those presented in the main text.
13The detailed estimation results corresponding to the Figures shown in the paper are reported in the
Online Appendix.
14Using data from the Labor Force Survey we find no correlation between the local unemployment
rates and the overtime hours of young workers.
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Figure 2: The effect of unemployment rate at entry on pecuniary outcomes
Note: The figure shows the effect of unemployment at entry (ur0) by year of experience (i.e., the
parameters βs of elements 1 [Expit = s] × uri0 in equation 1) on the following dependent variables: log
weekly wages in panel (a); log wage index in panel (b); log annual earnings in panel (c); log annual
weeks worked in panel (d). The sample in the baseline specification consists of 362, 682 observations of
Italian-born men who had their first labor market experience between 1994 and 2003 and who were under
24 years old at the time of entry. The sample size in the regression with additional controls reduces to
349,680 due to missing values. Connected triangles represent the effect of ur0 by year of experience in
the baseline specification which includes as controls the current unemployment rate (urit) and dummy
variables for: calendar year (θt), years of potential experience (ψs), region of birth (µb), region of entry
(λr), year of entry cohort (γl). Connected diamonds represent the effect of unemployment at entry (ur0)
by year of experience when the following characteristics of the first firm and job are added to the baseline
specification: dummies for sector and type of occupation (apprentice, blue collar worker and white collar
worker), firms’ average number of employees and age. The detailed estimation results are available in
Tables A2 and A5 in the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by region of entry per year of
entry. The dashed lines and the gray area show the 95% confidence intervals for the baseline specification
and the specification with additional controls, respectively.
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certain proxies of job safety by year of potential experience. In panels (a), (b) and (c) the
dependent variables are the number of injuries (injuries of any kind, IC injuries and NIC
injuries) suffered by a worker divided by the number of full-time equivalent paid weeks.
With this normalization, we are able to take into account heterogeneity in the exposure
to risk. In addition, these variables are expressed as the number of injuries per thousand
days worked to improve the readability of the estimates (i.e., to reduce the number of
decimals). However, variation in injuries at the individual level may be determined by
factors other than the risk imposed by the work environment but that are otherwise
connected to starting macroeconomic conditions. Indeed, a higher unemployment rate at
entry may induce workers to exert greater effort and/or it may constitute a stress factor
leading to less cautious behavior. Ideally, a measure of the risk imposed by the working
environment may be constructed by using the number of workplace injuries incurred by
the colleagues of young entrant “i” in each firm; however, this strategy is not feasible
because the WHIP dataset does not contain information on all workers employed at a
single firm. Therefore, at a level of greater aggregation, three injury indexes have been
computed (i.e., one for each category of injuries: all, IC and NIC) as the sum of injuries in
the 1994-2003 period divided by the corresponding sum of weeks worked in cells defined
using occupation (blue versus white collar), sector (ATECO 1991/ISIC rev 1.1 at two
digits) and region. These injury incidence rates have been computed using workers over
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Figure 3: The effect of unemployment rate at entry on individual level injuries and injury
incidence rates
Note: The figure shows the effect of unemployment at entry (ur0) by year of experience (i.e., the
parameters βs in equation 1) on two types of dependent variables: I) workplace accidents at the individual
level (expressed as the number of injuries per thousand days worked) for all injuries, non-immediate care
injuries (NIC), and immediate care injuries (IC) in panels a, b and c, respectively; II) Injury incidence
rates computed as the sum of injuries in the 1994-2003 period divided the corresponding sum of weeks
worked in cells defined using occupation (blue versus white collar), sector (ATECO 1991/ISIC rev 1.1
at two digits) and region. These workplace indexes have been computed using workers over 34 years
old for all injuries, non-immediate care injuries (NIC), and immediate care injuries (IC) in panels d, e
and f, respectively. The number of observations for individual injuries is the same as in Figure 2; due
to cells missing values, for the incidence rates it decreases to 349,379 and to 342,251 in the baseline
and in the additional control specification, respectively. The right vertical axis expresses these effects
as a percentage of the sample mean of the corresponding dependent variable. Connected triangles and
connected diamonds represent the effects of ur0 by year of experience in the baseline specification and
in the specification with additional controls, respectively (see the note to Figure 2 for information on
the controls used in the two specifications). The detailed estimation results are available in Tables A3
and A6 in the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. The
dashed lines and the gray area show the 95% confidence intervals for the baseline specification and the
specification with additional controls, respectively.
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rates as dependent variables to determine the effect of ur0 on the occupation-specific risks
faced by workers along their careers. To gauge the economic relevance of the estimated
effects, the right axis of each panel of Figure 3 reports the range of the estimated effects
in percentage terms; these are obtained by dividing the estimated effects (reported in the
left axis) by the sample average of the corresponding dependent variable.15
Panels (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 3 indicate a positive and significant effect of ur0 on
the number injuries (per thousand days worked) at the individual level, which increases
over time for all injuries and NIC injuries but remains constant for IC injuries. Com-
pared to the average number of injuries observed in the sample, the estimated effect of
a one-point increase in ur0 on the number of all injuries ranges from 3.5%, during the
first year, to 7.5% when workers have potentially accumulated ten years of experience.
When we restrict the analysis to NIC injuries, the estimated percentage effects are lower,
but their temporal pattern increases more steeply (from 2.2% to 6.4%). Instead, for the
estimated percentage losses in terms of IC injuries, which are of a greater magnitude (in
the range 13%-20%), we are unable to reject that they are constant over time. The differ-
ent magnitude and temporal pattern for IC and NIC injuries suggest that the reporting
behavior may depend on initial conditions; workers beginning their career in a relatively
15The average number of injuries per thousand days worked is 0.322. Distinguishing between NIC and
IC injuries, this figure is 0.296 and 0.026, respectively. The average value of the injury incidence rate
for all injuries is 10.996. Distinguishing between NIC and IC injuries, this figure is 9.958 and 1.038,
respectively.
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equalize. The absence of underreporting of IC injuries could explain why we find greater
percentage losses in terms of this type of injury. It is also worth noting that, in accor-
dance with Boone and van Ours (2006) and Boone et al. (2011), the effect of the current
unemployment rate is negative and significant for all injuries and NIC injuries, but it
is not statistically significant for IC injuries;16 the current economic cycle only affects
less serious injuries by changing the incentives to report this type of injury. Therefore,
we believe that the effect of the current unemployment rate on injuries mainly reflects
the reporting behavior of workers, while the effect of ur0, being robust to restricting the
analysis to IC injuries, truly implies a lower level of job safety.
Panels (d), (e) and (f) in Figure 3 describe the estimated effect of ur0 on the injury
incidence rates which, by construction, do not reflect the worker’s behavior and effort on
the job. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained by using injuries at the
individual level; entrants in recession persistently also lose in terms of injury incidence
rates. Therefore, we can exclude that the effects estimated at the individual level are
simply due to less cautious behaviors and/or greater effort. Comparing the estimated
coefficients to the observed averages of the indexes, the estimated percentage effect of a
one-point increase in ur0 on the three injury incidence rates is very similar, ranging from
1% to 2%. The lower magnitude of these estimated percentage effects with respect to what
16Table A3 in the Online Appendix reports these results in columns 1, 3, and 2, respectively.
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by the allocation of entrants to different tasks within cells. Similarly, the absence of
relevant differences between the estimates for IC and NIC indexes could be connected to
the aggregate nature of these proxies of injury risk, which, by averaging across workers,
eliminate differences in reporting behavior related to initial macroeconomic conditions.
To detect whether compositional effects related to observables drive our findings, in
Figure 4, we report the results obtained by using workers’ job and firm characteristics as
dependent variables (i.e., binary indicators for being an apprentice, blue collar and white
collar worker in panels a, b and c; average number of employees in panel d) in equation (1).
We find that entrants during recession have a constantly higher probability of working in
a blue collar occupation (panel b) and a lower probability of working in the more sheltered
apprentice position (panel a). Moreover, unfavorable starting conditions negatively affect
the probability of being white collar but only in the medium-long run (panel c). Panel (d)
indicates that there are no differences driven by initial conditions in firms’ size. As shown
in Figures 2 and 3, when we introduce initial firm attributes (sector, firm size and firm
age) and the type of occupation (apprentice, blue collar and white collar) as additional
controls in the main regressions, the estimated effects of the initial unemployment rate
on labor market outcomes are not affected. Moreover, the results are not altered by the
inclusion of the initial firm’s employee growth in previous years, thus suggesting that the
cyclical variation in the job-quality is not determined by different types of firms recruiting
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le in different stages of the cycle. Similarly, the introduction of initial contractual codedummies as additional controls does not affect the main results either, thus confirmingthat formal contractual arrangements hide a considerable heterogeneity in job quality
that, without the injury data, would not have been detected.17
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Figure 4: The effect of the unemployment rate at entry on job and firm characteristics
Note: The solid line in the figure shows the effect of unemployment at entry (ur0) by year of experience
(i.e., the parameters βs in equation 1) on the following dependent variables related to the worker’s job
or firm: binary indicators for being an apprentice, blue collar and white collar worker in panels a, b
and c; average number of employees in panel d. The sample used for the estimations in panels a, b and
c consists of 362, 682 observations, and it decreases to 345,589 observations in panel d due to missing
values. The regressions include as controls current unemployment rate (urit), calendar year effects (θt)
and dummy variables for years of potential experience, (ψs), for the region of birth (µb), for the region
of entry (λr), for the year of entry cohort (γl). All estimated coefficients are available in Table A4 in the
Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. The dashed lines
represent the 95% confidence intervals.
Therefore, the above evidence tends to exclude an explanation based on firm and job
17Contractual codes refer to a finer categorization of occupations (with respect to those used as ad-
ditional controls in Figures 2 and 3). These occupational codes are mainly related to seniority and to
automatic career progression and can be hardly used as a proxy of the skills needed in a given task
(Colleoni et al., 2009). Estimates with these additional controls are shown in Tables A9 and A11 in the
Online Appendix.
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The estimated positive association between local unemployment rates and entry wages
within occupations suggests that negative selection of entrants during recessions is un-
likely.18 This finding is confirmed by Figure 5, which displays the estimated effect of ur0
on the percentiles of the log wage distribution for the year of entry and the third, sixth
and ninth years of experience. After controlling for the characteristics of the first job and
firm, we do not detect negative effects of ur0 in any portion of the wage distribution.
Moreover, the observed dynamics of age at entry and educational choices along the
business cycle are not consistent with the negative selection of entrants during recessions.
Negative selection could occur because ”high productivity” potential entrants encoun-
tering negative macroeconomic conditions could wait for better opportunities, either by
accumulating additional years of education or remaining out of the labor force, or be-
cause ”low productivity” entrants could be forced to anticipate the entry into the labor
market if remaining in education became economically unviable. Therefore, if a process
of negative selection of entrants was at work during recessions, one should observe that
age at entry and the probability of being in education are negatively associated with the
18The bulk of the previous investigations examining the effect of entry conditions on wage dynamics
provide evidence in favor of positive selection of entrants (or absence of negative selection) during negative
macroeconomic conditions (Oyer, 2006; Genda et al., 2010; Kahn, 2010; Kwon et al., 2010; Oreopoulos
et al., 2012; Brunner and Kuhn, 2014). Finally, Devereux (2002) finds that firms increase their hiring
standards during a recession. This firm behavior may be more relevant in the Italian context characterized
by strict employment protection and a strong insider-outsider divide.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le unemployment rate.
19
-
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantiles
year of entry
-
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantiles
3rd year
-
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantiles
6th year
-
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantiles
9th year
 baseline spec. with additional controls
Figure 5: The effect of unemployment rate at entry on the log wage distribution
Note: The figure represents the effect of the unemployment rate at entry (ur0) on the percentiles of the
log wage distribution at the following years of experience: entry year, third year, sixth year and ninth
year. The effects correspond to the βs coefficients retrieved from the estimation with quantile regressions
of specification 1. The black solid line represents the estimated effect of ur0 in the baseline specification,
which includes as controls current unemployment rate and dummies for year of entry, region of entry,
region of birth, current year and experience. The connected diamonds represent the estimated effects
of ur0 after inclusion in the baseline specification of additional controls for initial firm characteristics
(sector, average number of employees and age) and type of occupation (apprentice, blue collar and white
collar). The sample in the baseline specification consists of 362, 682 observations of Italian-born men
who had their first labor market experience between 1994 and 2003 and who were under 24 years old at
the time of entry. The sample size in the regressions with additional controls decreases to 349,680 due
to missing values. The dashed lines and the gray area show the 95% confidence intervals for the baseline
specification and the specification with additional controls, respectively.
The results of regressing the age of entry on the regional unemployment rate, region
19In addition, migration of entrants across regional labor markets may react endogenously to differences
in regional unemployment rates and lead to selection mechanisms that may affect our results. In section
A.3.2 in the Online Appendix, we show that migration decisions are mainly determined by permanent
differences in job opportunities between regions and are not driven by the regional business cycle, and
we perform robustness checks.
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of variation of the unemployment rate within regions is, on average, approximately 4
percentage points, the size of the estimated effect is tiny. This positive correlation sug-
gests that cohorts entering the labor market during unfavorable conditions tend to be
marginally older and, therefore, it is not consistent with negative selection. Although
small, the effect of the unemployment rate on the age at entry may be the result of
strategic educational choices.20 However, the effect may simply reflect delayed entry due
to unemployment (which is very high in the Italian context, particularly in the South)
or non-employment. Since the education level of entrants is not reported in the WHIP
database, we tested the correlation between unemployment and educational choices for
our specific sample and time frame by exploiting pooled data from the Italian Labor
Force Survey. In the second and third columns of Table 1, we report the results of logis-
tic regressions in which the probability of being a high school and university student is
modeled as a function of the regional unemployment rate, also conditioning on age, region
and year dummies. The probability of attending high school or that of being a university
student are not found to be affected by the current economic cycle. This finding suggests
that the slightly higher age of entrants detected during economic contractions should
20Actually, high unemployment may exert opposite effects on the decision to remain in education: a
higher unemployment probability decreases the opportunity cost of the educational investment; however,
at the same time, it decreases the returns to education and the resources of families. The evidence is
scant for Italy. Carmeci and Chies (2006), who focus on the decision of further education at the end of
compulsory education for the 1993-1999 period, find that the level of unemployment rates do negatively
influence the decision to invest in further education, but the annual variation in unemployment has a
negligible effect.
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le be imputed to episodes of unemployment/non-employment before entry rather than tofurther accumulation of human capital.Table 1: The effect of labor market conditions on entry decisions
(1) age0 (2) High School student (3) University student
ur0 0.044
∗∗∗
(0.016)
urt 0.018 -0.006
(0.034) (0.006)
N 80331 143009 196150
(Pseudo)R2 0.082 0.103 0.070
Note: The table reports the effect of labor market conditions on the age at entry (age0, in column
1) measured using the WHIP-Salute dataset and on indicator variables for being a high school student
(column 2) and for being a university student (column 3), measured using the Italian Labor Force Survey
on a sample of young workers selected with the criteria explained in section III. All of the regressions
include year fixed effects and region fixed effects. The results of column 1 are based on an OLS regression.
Columns 2 and 3 report the results of logistic regressions that include age as an additional covariate. ur0
refers to the unemployment rate of the region of entry in the year of entry. urt is the contemporaneous
unemployment rate in the region of residence. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region
per year. Pseudo R2 measures are provided for logistic regressions in columns 2 and 3.*** significant at
1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at 10%.
To further study the possibility of positive selection mechanisms, we have used the
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) from the Bank of Italy. The information
available in this dataset on the payment of pension contributions allows us to identify
formal and informal workers.21 Employment in the underground economy is a possible
consequence of recessions that cannot be studied with administrative data but may be
a relevant phenomenon in the Italian case. We thus replicate the analyses of section IV
with the same sample restrictions explained in section III and using a specification similar
21The exact formulation of the question we use is: “Considering your lifetime work experience, did
you ever pay, or your employer pay, pension contributions, even for a short period?” If an individual
replies negatively to this question and declares to be employed, it means that she has been working in
the underground economy during her entire career (Cappariello and Zizza, 2010).
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le to equation 1. The only difference is that, instead of interacting the initial unemploymentrate with the experience dummies, here, to diminish the number of estimated parameters,we posit that the effect of the initial unemployment rate is linear in experience.22
Table 2: The effect of labor market conditions on pecuniary outcomes. Data from SHIW
log annual log months log monthly Probability
earnings worked wages underground
sample (1)All (2) Only (3)All (4) Only (5)All (6) Only (7)All
formal formal formal
ur0 0.017 0.041
∗∗ 0.021 0.035∗∗ -0.011 0.005 0.032∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012)
ur0× Exper. -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗ -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
N 1278 1135 1262 1128 1262 1128 1278
R2 0.304 0.284 0.177 0.183 0.215 0.209 0.151
Note: The table reports the effect of unemployment at entry on log annual earnings (columns 1 and
2), log months worked (columns 3 and 4), log monthly wages (columns 5 and 6) and a binary indicator
variable for being an informal worker (column 7). All variables are measured from the SHIW dataset on
a sample of young workers selected with the criteria explained in section III. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 use
the entire sample of workers (i.e., formal plus informal), whereas columns 2, 4 and 6 use only the formal
ones. The results are obtained from OLS regressions of the specification: yit = α + ψExperienceit +
δuri0 +βuri0×Experienceit +φurit +µb +λr +γl + θt +uit. In contrast to the specification of equation
1, we use continuous experience and the effect of ur0 is linear in experience. All remaining controls are
equal to those in the baseline specification used in Figures 2 and 3. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by region of entry per year of entry. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%,* significant at
10%.
As shown in column 7 of Table 2, where the dependent variable is an indicator variable
for working in the underground economy, a percentage point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate at entry is associated with an increment of approximately 3 percentage points
in the probability of being employed in an informal job. This effect is persistent over time,
22Considering the lower number of observations and that we are using survey data, the precision of
the estimates should be lower than those obtained by using the WHIP-Salute database. In the SHIW
dataset, information on the number of weeks worked in a year is not available.
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23 Restricting the analysis only to formal workers (i.e.,
with paid pension contributions), we find a significant positive effect of unemployment at
entry on log annual earnings and on log of months worked and a positive effect (although
not statistically significant) on log monthly wages (see columns 2, 4 and 6 in Table 2,
respectively). These results are consistent with those found in the administrative WHIP-
Salute dataset.24 In contrast, when retaining all workers (formal and informal jobs; in
columns 1, 3 and 5) in the sample, we do not find statistically significant effects of unem-
ployment at entry on log of weeks worked and log of annual earnings, and the estimated
effect on log of monthly wages becomes negative (although not statistically significant).
In the segmented labor market theory, workers enter the informal sector because they
are rationed out of the formal sector as a result of an overly regulated labor market. In
the formal sector, wages are relatively higher because they are set above market-clearing
prices due to minimum wages. According to the SHIW dataset, (after controlling for
experience, region of entry, year of entry into the labor market, current year and current
unemployment rate) the monthly wage of workers employed in the underground econ-
omy is approximately 24% lower with respect to that of formal workers.25 Hence, the
positive effect of the unemployment rate at entry on pecuniary outcomes detected in the
WHIP-Salute dataset could be due, at least in part, to this countercyclical pattern of the
underground economy.
23Indeed, the observed probability to hold a job in the underground economy is approximately 11
percent. This countercyclicality of the underground economy is consistent with the results of Orsi et al.
(2014).
24The size and the statistical significance of the estimated effects decrease as workers accumulate labor
market experience.
25All of the estimated effects remain stable once we also control for all the available firm (size and the
sector) and worker (level of education, age at entry, type of occupation and family wealth) characteristics.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
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the observed increase in workplace accidents, together with the anticyclical pattern of
selection into the underground economy, may be explained by the endogenous changes in
wage offers curves and in entrants’ attitudes toward risk outlined in Figure 1. Unfortu-
nately, the coexistence of several sources of unobserved firms’ and entrants’ heterogeneity
do not allow us to disentangle the compositional effects due to the positive selection from
changes in market opportunities and preferences (Rosen, 1974).
Effect on workers’ mobility and tenure
Workers’ mobility may help explain what drives the increase in injuries and whether
such dynamics are consistent with existing theoretical models. We investigate whether
entrants during recessions search more intensively (consistent with job-search models)
and accumulate lower experience or tenure. Figure 6 displays the estimated effect of
unemployment at entry on entrants’ mobility (i.e., binary indicators for being in the
entry firm, panel a; being in a firm different from that of the previous year, panel b;
being out of the WHIP-Salute sample, panel d; and years of tenure in the current firm,
panel c) using the same specification of equation (1) and using data from the second year
of potential experience onward.26 Entrants do not exhibit a higher probability of leaving
the initial firm (panel a) and are not more likely to change firms as time goes by (panel
26During the year of entry, the analyzed outcomes are the same for all workers.
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Figure 6: The effect of unemployment rate at entry on labor market transitions
Note: The solid line in the figure shows the effect of unemployment at entry (ur0) by year of experience
(i.e. the parameters βs in equation 1) on the following dependent variables: binary indicators for being
in the entry firm (panel a) and being in a firm different from that of the previous year (panel b), tenure
measured as the number of years in the current firm (panel c), and non-employment status (i.e., a binary
indicator for being out from the WHIP-Salute sample during the current post-entry year) (panel d).
The sample uses data from the second year of potential experience onward for our sample of entrants
(282,351 observations for panels a, b and c; 373,847 observations for panel d, as the dependent variable
is defined also for years in which the workers are not observed in the sample). These OLS regressions
include as controls the current unemployment rate (urit), calendar year effects(θt) and dummy variables
for years of potential experience, (ψs), for the region of birth (µb), for the region of entry (λr), and for
the year of entry cohort (γl). All estimated coefficients are available in Table A7 in the Online Appendix.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. The dashed
lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.
These findings are in sharp contrast with the evidence for less rigid labor markets
where between-firm mobility is a key ingredient for the catch-up process, particularly in
the short-medium run (see for example Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Indeed, the dynamics
shown in panel (c) display very tiny negative effects on tenure (lower for entrants in
27Given the nature of the data, the non-employment status may hide a transition to jobs in the public
administration or to self-employment, which are not entirely covered by INPS administrative archives.
However, for a young low- and medium-skilled male, these outcomes were negligible in those years.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le recessions) only in the long run. Panel (d) shows that entrants during a recession havea lower probability of being non-employed. This higher attachment to the labor market,coupled with the estimated initial wage premium and the evidence of the previous section,
opposes an explanation of the losses based on the lower productivity of workers entering
during a recession.
Given that we do not detect a lower accumulation of tenure or experience for entrants
during recessions, our findings could, at least in part, be rationalized with the human
capital mechanisms proposed by Gibbons and Waldman (2006) who suggest that, if en-
trants are assigned to low-quality tasks, initial conditions may have persistent effects by
decreasing worker productivity. Moreover, as suggested by Oreopoulos et al. (2012), the
recovery from unfavorable initial conditions may be hampered by the accumulation of
specific human capital, which increases the opportunity cost to change jobs. In the Ital-
ian context, these mechanisms may be reinforced, as accumulating human capital is not
merely accumulating knowledge for labor market entrants but is also an investment to be-
come insiders. This could explain why, in contrast to other countries, during unfavorable
conditions, entrants do not display a higher search intensity and do not catch-up as time
passes. With respect to labor markets that are characterized by less rigid institutional
settings, entrants’ incentives to search for “better” jobs may be comparatively lower.
This interpretation is also supported by the estimates from a specification where the ef-
fects of experience and of initial conditions are allowed to vary for employees working in
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Figure 7: The effect of unemployment at entry for stayers and movers
Note: The figure reports the estimated effect of unemployment at entry (ur0) for stayers and movers
on log weekly wages (panel a), all injuries (panel b), non-immediate care injuries (NIC in panel c), and
immediate care injuries (IC in panel d). Stayers are the individuals who remain with the first employer.
Movers are those individuals working in a firm that is different from the first employer. The right vertical
axis expresses these effects as a percentage of the sample mean of the corresponding dependent variable.
Connected diamonds represent the estimated effects of ur0 by year of experience for stayers (i.e., the
parameters βs in equation 1 where stayers are the omitted category). Connected triangles represent the
estimated effects for movers. The latter are estimated as the effect of unemployment at entry (i.e., the
estimated effect, βs, for the omitted category, stayers) plus the coefficient of an additional interaction
term, 1 [Expit = s] × uri0 ×moverit, included in equation 1. By construction, an individual can be a
mover only after the year of entry (i.e., from year 1 onward). The regressions use the same sample of
the baseline specification of Figure 2 and include the following as controls: the current unemployment
rate; dummy variables for calendar year, years of potential experience, region of birth, the region of
entry and year of entry cohort; and the interactions 1 [Expit = s] ×moverit, for s > 0. The gray area
and the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for stayers and movers, respectively. Robust
standard errors are clustered by region of entry per year of entry. All estimated coefficients are available
in Table A8 in the Online Appendix.
We find that movers have a relatively lower wage growth and a lower decrease in
28We use the same specification of equation 1 plus the following interactions for s > 0: 1 [Expit = s]×
uri0×moverit, 1 [Expit = s]×moverit, where moverit is an indicator variable for working in a firm that
is different from the entry firm.
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29 The worst evolution of movers’ careers could, at least in part,
be explained by lay-offs of less productive workers. Nevertheless, further considering
that the estimated effect of initial labor market conditions is the same for movers and for
stayers (as shown in Figure 7), our findings indicate that, on average, changes in employer
are not associated with better labor market outcomes also for workers who begin with
unfavorable conditions. To explain these patterns alone, job-search models and human
capital models should feature prohibitive mobility costs and/or no benefits associated
with job search.
V Conclusions
Our results clearly identify a category of workers at higher risk of injuries during re-
cessions. Moreover, similar to what was found by other studies analyzing differences
in injuries between temporary and permanent workers (Guadalupe, 2003, Picchio and
Van Ours, 2017), the observed different reporting behavior for severe and less severe ac-
cidents suggests that entrants during unfavorable macroeconomic conditions have a weak
bargaining position that may lead them to underreport injuries. Therefore, authorities
could improve injury prevention effectiveness by directing more controls to entrants and
calibrating audits according to the business cycle. Our findings also indicate that the
negative and persistent effects of unemployment at entry on job safety may depend on
the institutional setting and on the rigidities of the Italian labor market. A centralized
wage setting system, although decreasing differences in monetary remunerations among
29The detailed estimation results can be found in Table A8 in the Online Appendix.
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le different cohorts of workers, cannot prevent the transmission of shocks to other job char-acteristics, particularly if these amenities are less easily measured and are less subject tobargaining and monitoring than pecuniary outcomes.
Transitions to more hazardous tasks during recessions do not necessarily entail the
creation of new risks; however, they may induce a more unequal distribution of risk
between different cohorts of entrants and, generally, between incumbent workers and
young outsiders. A redistribution of hazardous tasks towards young workers implies that
injuries will be more likely to occur at earlier stages of a career, thus exerting their neg-
ative effect over a longer period. This non-pecuniary adjustment mechanism, although
enhancing flexibility at entry, may entail sizeable indirect/uninsured and human costs as-
sociated with permanent reductions in entrant’s health, human capital accumulation and
productivity (De Greef et al., 2011). Thus, labor market reforms that target diminishing
the dualism between incumbent workers and new entrants (such as the recent changes
introduced by the so-called Job Act of the Italian government, Legislative Decree No.
23/2015) and the rigidities in the wage-setting mechanisms may contribute to reducing
long-lasting disparities among different cohorts of workers.
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